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AN OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 'WITTGENSTEIN ON PRIVATE LANGUAGE'
In this paper I set out to demonstrate the following-
1. Wittgenstein's primary concern in PI 243 is to expose the
Muddles involved rather than to provide a definition of the
private language. The Muddles are nc ion of privacy and some
misguided conceptions of names.
2. The 2 Muddled notions of privacy namely (i) ep i stemi c
privacy ('Only I can know, or know with a greater certainty,
whether I am in pain') and (ii)privacy of ownership ('Only I
can have my pain') stem from private linguists' aborgation of
normal l anguage-game., mistaking asymmetry in language-game as
nature of pain., conflating grammar of physical objects and
that of sensations, being misled by the assertoric form of
first-person sensation talk. Also come into play is the
misapplied metaphor of 'inside-outside'.. 'internal-external:'..
'direct-indirect', 'inner process' which espouses the
misleading picture of a secret inner process intelligible to
oneself alone. When used in ordinary sense, the notion
'privacy' is actually as all right as any other notions but is
no longer so when one is philosophizing and falls prey to the
wrong-headed picture of inner process/private experience it
inexorably repeats to us.
3. Coupled with ideas like 'language as nomenclature', 'name as
label (to object named)', and blanket terms like 'refer to',
'stand for', 'associate with', the illusion of private
language comes into existence which Wittgenstein evacuates by
carrying out grammatical investigation of normal language-game
and reminding us of the acyQtual use of sensation words.
4. Wittgenstein's grapple with the various problematic notions
and pictures climaxes in the famous Diarist Argument where
Wittgenstein intimates the most favourable condition for the
dream of a private language, proving their inadequacy even
there.
w a Not seeing 1), his critics, especially those private linguist
inclined, overlook all problematic notions and pictures laid
bare by Wittgenstein and unfortunately keep them alive in
their discourse, which give rise to a series of
mi sinterpretation on Wittgenstein's discussion of the private
language. Their misunderstandings can well fit into the
followina pattern:-
a. Condemning Wittgenstein's definition of private language in
PI 243.
b. Proceeding rashly to Diarist Argument without paying due
attention to. Wittgenstein's onslaught of the 'privacy'..
c. They invariably misinterpret the Diarist Argument as
problem of memory and blame Wittgenstein for unwarranted
skeptism of our memory.
d. They then incorrectly diagnose Wittgenstein as upholding
verificationist theory of meaning or linguistic
behaviourism»
6. The sort of mi sinterpretion mentioned in (5) entirely miss the
point as Wittgenstein actually theorizes in a theoretical
domain transcending that of behaviourism and Cartesianism.
7. His positive account of the language-game of pain is that it
rests on our natural, primitive pre~linguistic reactions and
instinctive responses to those with pain; the language-game of
pain is actually an extension of our instincts, a component of
huamn natural history. Hence, any proponents of alternative
language-game must bear the unenviable task of demonstrating
how the candidate can have a foothold in our network of
instinctive responses and natural history.
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REMARKS ON PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
The philosopher's treatment of a
question is like the treatment of
an illness. F'I 255
A picture held us captive. And we
could not get outside it, for it
lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us
inexorably. PI 115.
Chapter I
The Private Language Case
Many critics complain that Wittgenstein's notion of
private language is hopelessly vague, ambiguous and unclear.
Commentators like Ayer has his discussion preceded by a
clarification of the notion.1. R. Jones suggests to
distingusih three notions of a private language. First
there is the notion of a language which is private in the
sense that only the speaker can, as it happens, speaks it,
though the language could be taught to others in any of the
various normal ways we have of teaching a new language to
someone who does not know it already. An example of such a
language would be a private code straight forward1y
translatable into English.... Secondly, there is the
notion of a language such that no one other than the speaker
could understand it even i-f all the experiences of the
speaker were available to others. This would be a language
some feature or other of which, irrespective of what the
language is about, would make it logically impossible that
anyone other than the speaker should understand it or fallow
its rules..... Thirdly, one might consider the possiblity
of a language which cannot be taught to, or learnt by,
anyone other that the speaker because it is a language which
is used to talk about objects which are private i.e. not
directly or indirectly observable.2 On the other hand,
some protest that Wittgenstein should have offered some sort
of proof for his claim that the private language is
unintelligible to other except the speaker.
Does this sort of accusation do justice to
Wittgenstein? Is Wittgenstein really not aware of the
intricacy of the issue and has done nothing towards
clarifying the notion? Let us examine F'I 243, the section
which is alleged to be the opening remark of the whole
private language argument.3 Because of its importance,
it is worth quoting in full:—
A human can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey,
blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a' question and
answer it. We cound even imagine human beings who spoke
only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by
talking to themselves— An explorer who watch them and
listened to their talk might succeed in translating their
language into ours (This would enable him to predict these
people's action correctly, for he also hears them making
resolutions and decisions.)
3But could we also imagine a language in which a person
could write down or give vocal epresssi on to his inner
per iences-- his feelings, moods and the rest-- for his
private use?-- Well, can't we do so in our ordinary
1anguage? But that is not what I mean. The individual words
of this language are to refer to what can only be known to
the person speaking to his immediate private sensations.
So., another person cannot understand the language.(P1 243)
Wittgenstein's strategy is to construct several
imaginary cases, which serve as intermediate cases, to stand
in contrast with the putative private language, so as to
delimit it, if not sharply define, with suffficient clarity.
Wittgenstein calls our attention to two cases in the first
paragraph. It is suggested in an earlier remark (F'I 242),
language is a means of communication, now, in the first
imaginary case, a human being, endowed with full actuality
of communication, takes refuge from inter-personal discourse
and 'communicate' with himself: "encourage himself, give
himself order.... etc". In the second case, what is
exceptional becomes the rule-- "human beings who spoke only
in monologue". Before proceeding to the second paragraph,
Wittgenstein points out that the language which the
imaginary soliloquists in the second case uses is merely
contingently unshared rather than essentially unsharable,
because if an explorer who watched them and listened to
their talk might succeed in translating their language into
us."
In the second paragraph, Wittgenstein stretches our
imagination further by introducing a new condition--a
language of inner experiences. He expresses it in the form
of a question-- "could we also imagine a language in which
a person could write down or give vocal expression to his
inner experiences— his -feelings, moods and the rest— for
his private use? He makes plain at once his intention by a
remark;
Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?— But, that
is not what I mean(PI 243).
Here Wittgenstein's intention is crystal-clear, he does
not question our daily practice of talking about our inner
experiences. The English sub-language of inner experience,
for instance, is far -from being a private language.
Immediately following this remark, he puts his card on the
tables laying down an explicit characterization of his
target conception by reference to three features: (a) the
words of the language are to refer to what can only be known
to the speaker,. (b) the words of the language are to refer
to the speaker's immediate private sensations, (c) another
person cannot understand the language. Wittgenstein is
now contrasting between the everyday sensation language-game
and the problematic private language. That is to say their
paramount difference is highlighted. Then what is their
difference? We notice a change i_Q WQCdi_Q9. i«e« Wittgenstein
characterizes them differently. He employed the term 'inner
experience' in the former case but 'private sensation' in
the latter. We have ground to say that Wittgenstein did
this deliberately, as he declares elsewhere s
The 'private experience' is a degenerate cgnstruction of our
grammer (comparable in a sense to tautology anc
contradiction). And this grammatical monster fools us.(NFL
n.27G)
Actually, he even mocks his enemies for employing the teri
?nrivate'
We are inclined to say that for the statement that I have a
toothache there is a certain justification, which consists
in my having a toothache; and we say that this justification
is private— I say z if the justification is private, then
you can't call it private— meaning: it has no sense to
say that anyone could know it. F'epys had a private language,
but one that could be divulged,, (Rush II p.9)
We say •only he knows whether he says the truth or lies'.
'Only you can know if what you say is true.'
Now compare secercy with the 'privateness' of personal
experience! In what sense is a thought of mine secret? If I
think aloud it can be heard— 'I have said to myself a
thousand times but not to anyone else'(NFL p.270)
And we shall see much of the discussion fallowing PI
243 centres around the idea of privacy, Wittgenstein tries
his utmost to do away with this degenerate construction.
Here, Wittgenstein is hinting at his target conception.
Similarly, the phrase 'refer to' is no less problematical,
he deals with it in the next remark —PI 244. (See also P3
274) In fact, this sentence 'The words of language are -to
refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations'
embodies one of the main pictures Wittgenstein mercilessly
combats. We shall come to this in the next chapter, to
justifiy my claim, suffice here I quote the following
n a ssan=»=;:
'I'm giving the feeling which I'm having now a name'—
don't quite know what you are doing.
'This pain I call toothache and I can never make hii
understand what it means.'
But we are under the impression that we can point tc
the pain, as i t were unseen by the other person, and name
For what does it mean that this feeling is the meaning
of this name?
Or, that the pain is the bearer of the name?(NFL p.234)
All I want to say is that it is misleading to say that the
word 'fright' signifies something which goes along with the
experience of expressing fright. (NFL p.233)
6Now, as the foregoing discussion shows., Wittgenstein's
intention in PI 243 is to lay bare the muddles, misguided
joictures, notions involved rather than to give a definition
of the private language. His primary concern is to provide
therapy for those private linguist inclined, to enlighten
them and to set them free from what is problematic-- 'To
show the fly the way out of the fly--bottle' (PI 309).
Preceding his treatment/therapy is his diagnosis set out in
PI 243 -- Wittgenstein is speaking for the private
linguists, in their capacity as well as in their misleading
language/terminology., about their dream and what upon which
rest their dream. Thus, his 'diagnosis-, which his critics
view as definition or characterization of the private
language, is full of loaded words and muddled notions such
as 'private', 'refer to' which Wittgenstein endeavours to
dispose of. The above-quoted passages reveal that the 2
components of the miserable dream are:
(i) a 'private' realm-- a Cartesian secret mental realm
accessible to oneself alone.
(2) language as nomenclature or label-attaching conception
of names.
When coupled, they give rise to the following erroneous,
picture: sensation words being labels (i.e. 'referring to')
of those something in the ever-concealing-to-other inside,
coupled with the wrong-headed idea dictated by the label-
attaching conception that understanding a,word is to know or
to have access to the item labelled, so only the speaker can
7understand the words as none can have access to that
mysterious something. Hence, unsharability, which some of
his critics unjustifi.ably put the burden of proof on him, is
a necessary consequence, a 'built-in' feature of the
language conceived under the misguided picture. Equally
unfair is the criticism that his 'definition' is unclear or
ambiguous. First of all, as mentioned above, he does not
mean to offer a definition of the putative private language,
a yardstick which we can rely on to tell whether something
is private language or not, but something of assistance to
get rid of the dream of a private language. Secondly., the
contrasting cases he constructed to clarify' his target
conception should be clear enough if followed closely.
Especially revealing is its contrast with the everyday
sensation talk. This on the one hand makes it plain that it
is not the everyday sensation talk- but the misconceptions
about it Wittgenstein is opposing, on the other has the
advantage of reminding us Of the implausibility of the
target conception -- if so conceived, our sensation
language-game' will then be a case of private language with
unsharability, which is certainly not the case. Nor should
Wittgenstein. I venture to say, be blamed for proceeding in
a quite roundabout way -- constructing contrasting cases.
In a sense, he is forced to do so due to the peculiarity of
the issue -- most of the misused words, misleading sentences
involved sound completly like English. For instance, words
like 'private', 'refer' are as all right as other words when
used in the original,home. However, they are no longer so
8in the case of private language issue where 'private'
invariably associates with the intelligibilty-to-oneself-
al one and 'refer' with label-attaching conception of names.
Though misused, they exhibit no difference in superficial
grammatical form, and what is most bewitching is that the
resulting sentence resembles one with a use. Take the
phrase 'refers to private sensation' as an example, it can
have a use when resorted to explain the difference between a
sensation word and a word of a physical object, say
'table'(These point are dealt with in other chapter).What is
worse in the present case is that the description (of the
muddles) itself looks like a definition. (In reality, many
critics regard it so). Perhaps this would not cause
confusions if it is borne in mind that Wittgenstein's
primary concern is therapy. To avoid misunderstanding,
Wittgenstein adopts the, strategy of not using the term
'private language' in P I 243. Neither- does he word the
issue as 'Can there be a private 1 anguage?' 4 or 'Is
private language possible as some commentators do.
Because both would tempt one to indulge in bringing out the
different senses, not all of which are problematical., of the
term 'private l anguage', making one forget the therapeutic
function of section 243 and held victimized in the medium of
those blanket terms.
So much for the intricacy of the issue, the full force
of which can only be sensed/shown in the course of
Wittgenstein's therapy which will be elaborated in later
9Chapters.
In conclusion it would be a grave mistake to be
distracted by the alleged vague 'definition' from what is
important, especially the seemingly innocent but actually
most bewitching notion of privacy This point will be clear
later
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There is not a philsophical method,
though there are indeed methods,
like different therapies.----F'I 133
The work of the philosopher consists
in assembling reminders for special
purpose. ----F' I 127
Chapter 2
Wittgenstein's Therapy
As mentioned above those 2 roots of private language
are the notion of privacy and the apparent plausibility of
clarifying the functioning of sensation words by blanket
term like refer.,'describe','name. Wittgenstein assembles
reminders and therapy in F'I 246 to F'I 254 for the former
and PI 244., P I 256 onward for the latter. Let us deal with
them separately.
1 The Bewitchment of the notion of Privacy
Needless to say., Wittgenstein does not want to deny the
obvious truth that people have a 'private' mental* life., in
the sense that they. have for example thoughts they do not
utter- and pains they do not show, it is that notion of
privacy propounded by the claimants of private language that
Wittgenstein is opposing. The misconception to be dissipated
runs as follow:
No one .can know that another person is in pain or has any
other sensation, -for sensations are private in the sense
that no one can feel( experience, acquainted with) another
person's sensations.
or
Everyone acknowledges that sensations are private, that no
one can experience another person's sensation,so that the
special felt quality of each person's sensations is known to
him alone.l
When coupled with some simplified conceptions of
language (e.g. language as nomenclature), one 'is easily
misled into the conviction of a private language. The
alleged insurmountable barrier to knowability involved(
'privacy' of sensations), Wittgenstein undertakes to show,
rests on a tangle of confusions. According to Wittgenstein's
diagnosis, there are 2 separate, though interrelated,
muddles in those private linguists' conception of .privacy:
(i) epistemic privacy( 'Only I can know whether I. am
really in pain) and (ii.) privacy of ownership ('Another
person can't have my pains').2 Wittgenstein deals with
them separately.
1.1 Epistemic Privacy
In what sense are my sensations 'private'?—Well ,only I can
know whether I am really in pain; another person can only
surmise it—In one way this is wrong, and in another
nonsense. If we are using the word 'to know' as it is
normally used( and how else are we to use it? ),then other
people very often know when I am in pain.—Yes, but all the
same not with the certainty with which I know myself! —It
can't be said of me at all( except perhaps as a joke) that
I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean —except
perhaps that I am in pain?
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations
only from my behaviour,— for I cannot be said to learn o-f
them. I have them.
The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people
that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say i1
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about myself.( PI 246)
There are 2 theses rejeced by Wittgenstein in the first
paragraph. They are (i) Others cannot know that I am in
pain., the best they can do is surmise, since only I know
whether I am really in pain and (ii) I know I am in pain
with a certainty unavailable to others thus even if
others can know whether I am in pain, they know with less
certainty.
1.11 'Only I can know whether I am in pain'
To (i) Wittgenstein's reply is' In one way this is
wrong and in another nonsense'. Why is (i) wrong?
Wittgenstein's answer is simple but powerful:' If we are
using the word to know as it is normally used, then other
people very often know when I am in pain'.'It is a matter of
fact that we, in numerous occasions, pass judgements on
others' inner states( feeling, sensation, pain etc and
our judgements turn out to be true. We certainly very often
know others' sensation, and others know ours as well.' <3>
Thus, the claim that only the sufferers know whether he/she
is in pain is false. The misguided picture 'what is
internal is hidden from us', Wittgenstein di gnoses, is what
makes (i) so convincing. To this, Wittgenstein reminds us,
the future is too hidden from us, but the astronomers
calculating an eclipse do not say that they cannot know when
there will be an eclipse but merely surmise it (PI p.233)
Similarly, if I see someone writhing in pain with evident
cause I do not think: 'all the same, his feelings are
hidden from me' (PI p.223). Finally, he concludes that I
cannot know what is going on in him is above all a picture.
It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does
not give the reasons for the conviction, they are not
readily accessible'( PI p„223). 'To appreciate
Wittgenstein's approach, consider what supposedly renders
knowledge impossible: not feeling pain, nor even feeling
pain .in his body, but feeling his pain. Only that would
satisfy the skeptic. But the hypothesis does not make sense;
it is ruled out by grammar. Nor therefore does the denial
make sense(Man 176,48). So we need some other criterion for
knowing his pain. But what criterion? Well, the ordinary
one —the one that permits us to say we know he is in
pain.'4 Wittgenstein adds, 'Just try— in a real, case—
to doubt someone else's fear or pain'( PI 303).
Well, the private linguists may retort, 'Are we perhaps
over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of an unwearied
infant is not a pretence?— on what experience is our
assumption based?' (PI 249) Is it possible that even
for those cases we definitely have no doubt whatsoever about
experiences of others are cases of pretence or lyinq?5
To evacuate the plausibility of this query, Wittgenstein
produces an ironic parallel, 'Why can't a dog simulate pain?
Is he too honest ?'(PI 250). To ascribe honesty to a dog is
as absurd as ascribing thought to a chair. What•Wittgenstein
calls for is a change of 'the way we look at things'(PI
122). The present issue is not empirical Con what
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experience is our assumption based?') as his opponents
construe, but one concerning our language. 'A child has
much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog cannot be a
hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere)-(PI p. 229),
'Lying is a l anguage--game that needs to be learned like any
other one' (PI 249). Both lying and pretence are
(acquired) skills which infant and animals lack,
Wittgenstein adds' Perhaps it is possible to teach him
(i.e. the dog) to howl on particular occasions as if he were
in pain, even when he is not. But the surroundings which are
necessary for this to be real simulation are missing' (PI
250). A piece of behaviour or utterance cannot in itself
be simulation or even pretence or lying but are so only in
appropriate circumstances e.g. on stage. This echoes a
conclusion reached in earlier sections (PI 142-224) where
Wittgenstein is concerned largely with the acqusition,
possession and exercise of concepts. 'To understand a
language means to be master of a technique' (PI 199). Having
a concept, Wittgenstein stresses, is capacities. Having
concepts like 'He is reading', 'Fie understands', 'He knows
how to go on' are far from having any mental process,
images, feelings of characteristic experiences, but the
ability to produce suitable utterance, reaction, behaviour
in appropriate circumstances. That is to say, the simplistic
picture of understanding fully a word as somehow spotting
the inner reference( mental process, object, image) of the
word is dismissed,, Analogous consideration applies, in
Wittgenstein's view, to the case of first-person sensation
talk e.g.' I am in pain', The spur i olis 'expedient of
recource to a laser-like act of attention pinpointing the
object and attack the sign'6 is entirely replaced by the
new view s 'words are connected with the primitive, the
natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their
place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then
adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later
sentences' (PI 244). In other words, 'the language-games
with expressions of feelings are based on games with
expressions of which we don't say that they may lie'(NFL
p.250). Similarly, for language-games of lying in
expression of sensation, 'the word 'lying' was taught us
in a particular way in which it was fastened to a certain
behaviour, to the use of certain expressions under certain
circumstances. Then we use it, saying that we have been
lying, when our behaviour was not like the one which first
constituted the meaning' (NFL p.252). This is the way our
language-game works. 'The language-games with expressions of
feeling are based on games with expressions which we don't
say that they may lie' (NFL p250).. As those expressions are
themselves the foundation and constitute part of the
criteria of the 1anguage-game, 'it is senseless to say; the
expression may always lie' (NFL p.250).' expressions can
always be lying ,how can we say this of the expressions to
which we fasten our words?(NFL p.252) Of course,
Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of exceptional
cases, but to generalize exceptional cases, saying that all
cases of claiming pain are pretence, then 'we are under a
temptation to misunderstand the logic of our expressions
here, to give an incorrect account o-f the use of our words.
Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like
if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept 'order' would
have lost its purpose'(PI 345).. To say all cases are
pretence would amount to making the concept 'pretence'
inapp1icab 1e!
1. 12
'I know I am in pain with a certainty unavailable to
others'
Let us bypass the second half o-f Wittgenstein's answer
( i.e. 'only I can know whether I am in pain' is nonsense)
and proceed to (ii) as the -following discussion applies well
to it. Do I know that I am in pain in a way and with a
certainty unavailable to others? This question',
Wittgenstein suggests,, is totally wrong-headed. It is out'o-f
question whether I know I am in pain with a higher, lower or
same degree of certainty as with others. 'It can't be said
o-f me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in
pain', Wittgenstein points out and adds,' what is it
supposed to mean— except perhaps that I am in pain?' (PI
246) Now his opponents are pushing at the primacy of
knowledge of subjective experience, citing as their support
the fact that the statement I know I am in pain has
privileged certainty. It seems an unquestionable -fact, but
to our surprise, Wittgenstein rejects it as illusion— it
is illegitimate (i.e. nonsense) to add I know to I am in
pain 'except perhaps as a joke', otherwise, it results in
a sentence means the same as I am in pain i.e. with I
know being redundant or superfluous. At present, it seems
that, at least for the case of a joke, the phrase I know
is not redundant provided it is not an epistemic usage 7(
This is obvious so as it functions in a joke). The key to
understand Wittgenstein's reply lies in the phrase I know
(actually Wittgenstein has it italicized) which has several
usages as it is normally used. To illustrate this, let us
consider the following. A man has been suffered from
stomach-ache but has sought no relief of it. His wife has
nagged him repeatedly, You are in pain, so go to a doctor!
Might he not at last exclaim in exasperation, I know I am
in pain, but we can't afford a doctor?8 Naturally we
would grant this instance of I know as meaningful, but it
is only an usage for expression of exasperation, not an
epistemic usage for expression of certainty. As Wittgenstein
has not denied its meaning-fulness in the case of a joke, he
would certainly admit its meaning-fulness in expressing
ex a sp eration» His t r enc han t opposition applies on1y to
adding I know to first-person present-tense sensation
statement e.g. I am in pain., because it is a violation
of the logic of I know in epistemic usage. Wittgenstein's
opponents have committed the mistake of regarding I know,
in virtue of its frequent. occurance and familarity, as
having a meaning in whatever circumstances, if not in
itself. This unfortunate tendency 'leads them to overlook
the fact that I• know that... does not get used in
situations where there has not gr eyygusl_y been any doubt(
e.g. I have never doubted whether I have two hands, so I do
not say that I know I have two hands), nor in situations
where it would be senseless try to doubt( Can I doubt that
I have a body? Can I there-fore say I know I have a body?
)9 'To put the matter in another way, I know has a
specialized use that lies, as it were, mid-way between two
extremes :On the one hand, it means more or less the same as
I am certain in normal situations e.g. law court. However,
it is not true that it -functions only to show one's own
subjective conviction, it indicates that objective evidence
is at hand to substantiate the claim being made. In this
sense, one says I know when one is ready to give
compelling grounds -for one's certitude. (OC 243,270) On the
other hand, I know is not me?ani ngf ul_ i.n Reference' to
BE2D2:§itieQS it would te meaningless or ungntel iigi bl e 'to
doubt.'10 To illustrate this, let us consider 2 reminders.
One belongs to Wittgenstein, the other to Cook.
Someone asks you whether it is raining, you tell him that it
is ,and then he asks, Are you certain? Here one might
reply, Yes, I know it is raining. I am looking out the
window( this might be a telephone conversation, for example
) Now, what is the function of I know here? Their
function is to indicate that one is in as good a position as
one could want for answering the question, Is it raining?
What makes it possible to use I know here as an expression
of certainty is that it would be intelligible for someone to
suppose that the speaker is not, in the particular instance,
in as good a position as one could want for correctly
answering a certain question or making a certain
statement .11 -C i.e. where doubt is nossihle!•
We te?ach a child, That is your hand, not that is perhaps
or probably your hand. That is how a child learns the
innumerable language-games that are concerned with his
hand. An investigation or question, Whether this is really
ti
a hand never occurs to him. Nor, on the other hand does
he learn' that he know that this is a hand. (OC 374)
To say I know..., the question, How do•- I know
must be capable of being answered.(OC 550) Hence, 'One
says I know where one can also say I believe or I
suspect; where,one can find out. (PI p.221) That is to say
, I know, according to Wittgenstein, can be genuine
sentence-forming operator in epistemic usage only for those
sentences where I suspect, I believe are also
applicable. But for the case of I am in pain, the
addition of I doubt or I believe produces a piece of
nonsense. If these are nonsense, then 'sheer nonsense'
would surely be Wittgenstein's verdict on I know I am in
pain. 12 (See p„ 2. i be 1 ow)
Undoubtedly, his opponents will not be satisfied with
Wittgenstein's analysis of the logic of I know, as they
think that this suits only ordinary empirical statements
such as it is raining, but never to statement as sp.ecial
as I am in pain. Wittgenstein's reply is that they are
confusing grammatical and experiential statement. If. I
know I am in pain appears as infallible or a priori, it is
because it is a grammatical, statement or rather a mi.sl.eadi.ng
way of gxgressi_ng the USE of I am in pain; only LJiUAGE
but NOJ fact has realty been bioblibib here. Wittgensteir
wr ites:
If I know etc is conceived as a grammatical proposition,
of course the I cannot be important. And it properly mean?
'There is no such thing as a doubt in this case' or 'The
expression I do not know makes no sense in this case'.
And of course it follows from this that I know makes nc
sense either.(OC 58)
Other grammatical use of I know concerns about linguistic
c ap acities13:
One child might say to another: I know that the earth is
already hundreds of years old and that would mean: I have
learnt it.(00 165)
Doesn't I know that that's a hand, in Moore's sense, mean
the same, or more or less the same as: I can make statement
like I have a pain in this hand or This hand is weaker
than the other or I once broke this hand, and countless
others, in language-game, or else does away with it.(OC
371)
We should also be clear by now why Wittgenstein holds that
I know I am in pain can at best mean the same as I am in
oain.
The same matter can also be viewed in the light of
Wittgenstein's criterial semantics:' I can't be said to
know that I have toothache if I can't be said not to know
that I have toochache. I can't be said to know indirectly
what the other has if I can't be said to know it directly
' (NFL p274). He illustrates as follows:
Suppose one said, The barber cuts hair only indirectly,
because he uses his hand. If you ask,What would it be
like to cut hair directly? ,we might answer,That makes no
sense. —But the use of lindi.rect.lyl suggests that the two
9EE°sites are si.go.ifleant And so it i_s. confusfng. (Rush
p. 13)
Cook makes a similar point, he says ,'its is tempting to
say: I can know that I am in pain, because I feel my pain,
and that is what I cannot do in the case of another person,.
But the plausibility of this is lost if one says, I can
know that I am not in pain because I can feel the absence of
pain myself, and that is what I cannot, feel in the case of
another person. One would want to reply: perhaps you are
feeling the absence of it right now! '14 (see also F'I
446-9)
One question remains;, seemingly an essential one: Why
is it nonsense to add I doubt to I am in pain? Even if
Wittgenstein's analysis of I know is true, his rendering
of I know I am in pain as nonsense still does not hold
water without'an affirmatinve answer to the above question-
According to Wittgenstein, this impossibility of doubt does
not, as the private linguists contends, lie in any fact of
nature, but a matter of grammar only- This possibility of
doubt is not permitted by the language-game i.en to doubt
whether I am in pain is nonsense because the game we play
with the expression I am in pain doesn't contain a doubt
in this form (NFL p.261-2)
To show the use of I am in pain is so, Wittgenstein's
usual strategy is to assemble a handful of reminders:-
...it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain!—That
means: if anyone said, I do not know if what I have got -is
a pain or something else, we should think something like,
he does not know what the English word gai.n means; and we
=ihnii1 r! pwril ai n i t to him....
If he now said, for example: Oh, I know what 'pain'
means; what I don't know is whether this, that I have now,
is pain—we should merely shake our head (F'I 288).
As stressed above, in Wittgenstein' view, this impossibility
of doubt has nothing to do with the nature or so-called
essence of pain, it is merely a matter of grammar.
Wittgenstein constantly warns us against mistaking
'asymmetry in our mode of expression....as a mirror image of
the nature of things'(NFL p.235)- The mistake of those
claimants of private language lies precisely in
misconstruing the differences between first-person and
third-person expression in sensation talk as a manifestation
of the privileged certainty of personal experiences.
Wittgenstein removes this erroneous inclination by the
11 9
We? teach the child the use of the word J to speak'— Later,
it uses the expression I spoke to myself—We then say, We
never know whether and what a person speaks to himself(NFL
ncrn
Surely if he knows anything he must know what he sees!— It
is true that the game of 'showing or telling what one sees'
is one of the most fundamental language-games; which means
that what we are in ordinary life call using language mostly
resuDDOses this aame(NFL d.240).
The notion of informing myself s I've a toothache and I
must go to the dentist. Suppose we asked where this
proposition derives its sense: is it from a game I play
with myself, or from a game I pfay wfth others? If I leave
out the second clause—I must go to the dentist—what is
the difference between saying these words, I 've a
toothache, (to myself) and making any other noise (to my
self)?
You might answer,They have been used before. Then it
is clear that 1 am fnformfng myself of something only
because I am using that phrases which I use to inform
The point Wittgenstein pushes at is that personal
experiences, in reailty, does not enjoy any privileged
status.15 Its seemingly so stems entirely from a feature
character!stic of our language s the language-games of
'showing or telling what one sees'( or generally speaking,
what one experiences) are frequent'1 y resorted to in our
oYs.CYb.ay use of language. The apparent foundational status
of personal experiences is only a fact about our language:
the place (i.e. relationships with other language—games) of
language-games of personal experiences in our language. Tc
free us from such temptation(i.e. conferring privilegec
certainty to personal experiences), Wittgenstein invites us
to see the way we learn our language and the way in which
the words or expressions get their meanings -from. Take the
expression 'to speak' as an example, when we were a child,
we were first taught and learnt its imQersonal. form, and
only since then, we managed to proceed to use it in the
personal form. That is to say, from the standpoint of
language acquisition, expressions in personal form (first-
person sensation sentence is an example) are parasitic
'•found' on those in impersonal form. The idea of the
privileged certainty loses its appeal completely when
Wittgenstein shows that the notion of informing myself is
totally wrong-headed. The sentence I 've a toothache.
derives its sense primarily from those games I play with
others' e.g. I 've a toothache and I must go to the
dentist. Hence, 'it is clear that I am informing Hiyseif- of
something only because,I am using that ghrase which I use to
inform someone else' According to Wittgenstein, we are
inclined to abstract I've a toothache from the context it
derives its sense (i.e dropping the second clause, ignoring
those special occasions under which this whole sentence has
uses), thinking that it is meaningful as before16.
Moreover, as none other than I now seems to be the
addressee, it 'must, so to speak, serve to inform myself.
As the decisive movement of the conjuring trick has been
made, it is easy for us to complete the whole myth—it not
only informs myself about my sensation, it conveys to me
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meanings which I am in a privileged position to understand.
If it. conveys anything., Wittgenstein insists., it conveys
something public. Wittgenstein reminds us, it has uses i.e.
gets its meaning and becomes meaningful., in a game we play
with other, thus., the meaning it 'conveys' is public and
intelligible to myself as well as to others. It is a.
misunderstanding of the logic of our language to claim that
when I say I experience x( where.. is a sensation of mine
).the sentence does inform myself of something to. which I
have privileged access.
Having got rid of the notion of informing to myself., we
are in a better position to appreciate Wittgenstein's
account: (1) neither I am in pain functions as description
of my inner senses (2) nor the I involved functions as
demonstrative pronoun and (3) the concomitant Expressive
Thesi s. r:: 17:• All of these 3 doctrines contribute to
Wittgenstein's position (F'l)-- 'the expression of doubt has
no place in the language---game' of self-ascription of pain (PI
`288). However, (3) is more important and lies at the heart
of Wi ttgenstei n' s position (F'1). (3). runs roughly as
follows: f i rst-person present-tense sensation sentences
derive their- sense from by replacing the instinctive,
primitive, natural expression(e.g. moaning, crying) of
sensations e. g. pai n. How. does it lead Wittgenstein to
posti on (F= 1) will be clear- later, our present problem is to
clear our way towards an appreciation of (3). -rhe apparent
implausibility of (1) is precisely the .obstacle that stands
in our way. As mentioned above, (1) and (3) are concomitant,
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(3) and the doctrine P1 that doubt has no place in the
language-game of I am in pain fall or stand together, the
denial of (1) cannot but damage Wittgenstein's onslaught of
epistemic privacy-- I know I. am in pain. Hence,
Wittgenstein labours much to defend (1) by laying bare the
confusions involved in holding (1) 's negation. Why do we
tend to treat first-person present-tense sensation sentences
as description? Here comes Wittgenstein's diagnosis.
Misled by the assertoric form of their superficial grammar,
together 'with the idea that language always functions in
one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts
--- which may be about houses 9 pain, good and evil, etc' (PI
:304), Wittgenstein points out, it is tempting to assimilate
I have pain", the expression of pain to the same form as a
description "I have 5 shillings'(NFL p.259). Despite its
superficial grammar, Wittgenstein maintains that, the
sentence "I have toothache is far from a description and
teaching the word toothache is far from teaching the word
tooth (NFL p.258). He stands firm to his Expressive Thesis
and insists that first--person present-tense sensation
sentences do not derive their sense from/by being
descriptions of our state of mind. He writes:
You might say., 'toothache' is a description of what goes
on inside us. But is moaning a description of behaviour?
I moan is a description of behaviour, but moaning is not.
The word toothache is like moaning, not like I moan
I have a toothache is no more the description of
behavi our- than moaning is. To call it a descriptions is
misleading in a discussion like this.
What we call. the description on of a feeing is as
defferent from the description of an object as the name of
a feeling is different from the name of an object.
Of Course toothache is not only a substitute for
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moaning. But it is also a substitute for moaning, and to say
this shows how utterly different it is from a word like
Wat son.( Rush p. 11).
Perhaps this word describe tricks us here', Wittgenstein
points out and adds.,' I say I describe my state of mind
and "I describe my room. You need to call to mind the
differences between the language--games' (PI 2190). 'Think
how many different kinds of thing are called
descriptions' (pl 24), Wittgenstein remarks, 'what we call
descriptions are instruments for particular uses. Think
of a machine-drawing, a cross--section, an elevation with
measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of
a description as a word- picture of facts has something
misleading about it: one tends to thirik only of such
pictures as hang on walls which seem simply to portray how a
thing looks, what it is like. (These pictures are as it were
id1.e)' (pl 291). As a single word is used for the whole
f ami 1 y of descriptions., it conceals their differences and
diversities. Any attempt to single out a common mechanism
or functioning pattern for them is bound to fail. Blanket
terms like 'refering to what is described' is as futile as
'word--picture', 'this does not bring the different language-
games any closer-' (P1 25). Take the eX,ample of the
confession that I thought Such--and--Such, which we may safely
regard as a description, but it should be noted that it is
remarkably different from a description of physical objects
say, my room. Wittgenstein writes„
The criteria for the truth of the confession that I thought
such--and-such are not the criteria for a true description of
a process. (and the importance 'of the true confession does
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not reside in its being a correct and certain report of a
process. It resides rather in the special consequences
which can be drawn from confession whose truth is guaranteed
by the special criteria of truthfulness (PI p.223).
Si Similarly, for the description of the content of my dream,
what went on within me' is not the eoint at all (P1 p.212).,
since the question whether the dreamer's memory deceives
him when he reports the dream after waking cannot arise,
unless indeed we introducing a completely new criterion for
the regort' s agLeei ng' with the dream, a criterion which
gives us a concept of 'truth' as distinct from
trut1-71f ul ness' here' (PI p.223). Here Wittgenstein
highlights the strong rlisanalogies between descriptions of
physical objects e.g. my room and description of non-
physical objects•<18>e.g. dream or thought. Whatever we
classify I have toothache as, it-obviously comes quite
close to confession of thoughts and far removed from a
description of physical objects e.g.I have 5 shillings.
Thus, we should never conflate these two even if we regard
I have toothache as description. It should be clear by
now why Wittgenstein holds that 'to call it(i. e. If "I have
toothache.) a descriptions is misleading in a disscusion•,
1 i ke that' (Rush p. 11). Wittgenstein sees clearly the danger
of doing so a If we regard .I have toothache as
description, we would rnosty< 19> fail to keep the
multiplicity of language--games in view, then we are inclined
not only to corn 1 ate the two but assi milate it to the
description of physical objects. As long as this move has
been made, we would readily 'transplant' all features of
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description of physical objects to "I have toothache", if
not regarding these features as 'inborn essences' of "I have
toothache." One of these features is the possibililty of
error and mistake since some degree and some kind of
recognition and identification are involved in applying "I
have 5 shillings". Hence, it goes without saying that "I
have toothache" is as liable to doubt as I have 5
shillings." <20> This stems from the recognition and
identification of sensations when applying "I have
toothache" as in the.case of applying "I have 5 shillings"
where identification or recognition of the thing 'shilling'
occurs. Adopting this position cannot but hold that there
are criteria for identifying sensations and grasp of them
are indispensable for mastering first-person present-tense
sensation talk. Another closely--knitted consequence is that
the uttering of "I have toothache" requires justification
which lies in identifying or having the right sensations
dictated by the critera. Wittgenstein raises objection at
these two points: When I say "I am in pain 'what I do is
not, of course, to identify my sensation by criteria: but
to repeat an expression' (PI 290). For Wittgenstein, the
right of using the word "pain" or "I am in pain" has nothing
to do with 'agreeing with criteria' but rather lies in our
forms of life and behaviour. Indeed the whole idea of
agreeing with criteria/identification by criteria is
condemned as muddle by Wittgenstein and he undertakes to
demonstrate its banality by dramatizing it as 'a bell rings
when the right sensation appears before our mind's eye'.
Take the word' toothache' as an example, Wittgenstein asks
us to imagine its identification by criteria goes like this
s a fleet of sensations go through me, a bell rings in my
head when my mind's eye spots a toothache(i.e. I feel
toothache). This bell does not lead us any further,
Wittgenstein comments, but' just gushes the guest i_on further
back~z£how d_id you recognize the bef! as a sign? There
may be a special way in which the word comes, Wittgenstein
stresses, but it is no explanation—His saying toothache
is really all that happen'(Rush p.14). He adds,'of course
he may cheat but this does not mean that that can't be
all'(Rush p.14). He does not let go the notion of
recognition either. His position is that there is no such
thing as recognition in applying I have toothache. He
first of all produces a reminder about the grammar of
'recognition':
People speak of 'recognition'. They say it is not enough
that you say red, you must also recognize it.
There are all sorts of experiences which we call
'recognition'. I recognize that as a cap, and further as my
cap. I go home ,go up to my table and sit down, etc. If a
philosopher asks you Do you recognize your table?, you
J-- 1,_, 11..—. 11
Again, I meet a man whom I suddenly recognize as So-
and--So. Suppose I meet some utter stranger. Could one s;ay I
recognize him as a human being? This is certainly vastly
rl i•£ -f n r»•£ r m ujh+ IaIIaIcar o e: r. cv, .-a L-- i r% n r-.•£ i n f!-. ca t--1- K or r- c-«
When I look at this chair as I repeatedly do, do I
recggni.ze this as brown? To say so would seem to mean
nothing but that I donf t ask myself fWhat is this?!
Why should the recognition of this as red not be just
'[•' h c.Vi ca% r iva i ca ra r ca r-£ c ai nn 11 u- ca H 11 i.i K i ..-J 'a
Is it all?
What does happen?(Rush p.17-18) (See also PI 601-5).
It is difficult to escape the ever-present temptation to
view recognition as something involving a comparison or
matching with a given sample criteria, etc. (F'I 604)
Hence, we are shocked at Wittgenstein's account. How could
the recognition of x just be the experience of saying the
word x? Our response will certainly be: 'Is this all?'
Wittgenstein anticipates this. What does happen? he
questions, urging us to make out that extra something if we
are suspicious of his account and thinking that this is not
all. We might be baffled and do not know what to do with
this question, since we are unclear what would count as an
answer to it. Wittgenstein comes to our rescue and supply a
model for us:
Suppose Wisdom met an old friend in the street and told me
of it, and I asked him How did it happen? He would say
some such thing as He came nearer, and I thought Surely
this must be Smith etc. The narrative he would give would
be somethino of this sort(Rush d.IS).
(This is obviously a grammatical remark. Wittgenstein wants
to draw our attention back to the daily use of the
expressionswords involved) Wittgenstein gives us a
challenge: take this narrative as a model. And now tell me
how you recognized me as you came in just now. The other is
a full-fledged case of recognition'(Rush p.18). We might be
baffled again and Wittgenstein answers for. us, You
recognized me, didn't you. But you could say nothing
corresponding to that narrative'(Rush p.18). We may still
not satisfy and ask,Did nothing happen? To this,
Wittgenstein remarks:
Did nothing happen? can be taken as a question of
experience or as a question of grammar. We say sometimes
nothing happened when we could say It happened that I
walked, my height didn't vary, my hair kept its colour, I
walked at a certain rate, etc. Is this latter something, or
is it nothing? If you once leave a certain standard, you
could say all sorts of things.
I teall you I saw a collision of buses in the street.
Did anything happen when you were there? Nothing
happened—i.e., taking the collision as an example, nothing
haoDened.
And now the question whether when say red you call
this all or not is a mere question of grammar(Rush p.IS).
His second move is to combat this notion in the light of his
criteria! semantics. To render the word recognition
meaningful or applicable, there must be 'criterion o-f
recognizing correctly or incorrectly'(Rush p.110).
Unfortunately, in the language-game of 'pain', no such
criterion exists. All that happens is uttering, saying, or
repeating the word 'pain'—the saying of 'pain' is itself
the criterion for 'correct' recognition, that means it
cannot talk about right here;
We talk of recognzing rightly and wrongly. 'It is the same
and he recognized it.' But here the criterion is that you
recognize it—:that you say 'pain' again. This really means
that it is impossible to recognize it wrongly—in fact that
there is not any such ,thing as recognition here.
With regard to a man who comes into the room, you would
not say,he is the same if you say he is the same. But in
the case in which the only criterion is that he says green
or moan(Rush p. Ill).
To put it in another way:
We use 'recognize' where we can say it is the same and he
recognized it. Here i.t is used only where there is a
di,stynctygrj between aggearance and rea.li.ty. Eut in this
other case there is no such distinction—Can you say He has
a toothache but he doesn't recognize it? or he had no
toothache, but it seemed to him he did, and he got along all
right?
Having rejected the notion of identification
recognition, Wittgenstein proceeds to another issue:
whether the uttering of I. have toothache. requires
justification. To follow it by because I feel it. does not
show that it needs justification and feeling it..etc., do
not play, the role of justification. Here we again committed
the old mistake of abstracting it out of its original home;
'the language-game in which they are to be applied is
missinq'(PI 95):
I say 'I have toothache' because I feel it contrast this
case with say the case of acting on the stage,, but can't
explain what havng toothache means because having
toothache= feeling toothache, and the explanation would
come to s I say I have it because I have it= I say I have
it because it is true= I say I have it because I don't lie.
One wishes to say s In order to be able to say that I have
toothache I don't observe my behaviour, say in the mirror.
And this is correct, but it doesn't follow that you describe
an observation of any kind(NFL p.274—275).
So much for the stage-setting of introducing
Wittgenstein's positive account of the logic of I am in
pain—the Expressive Thesis. It is adumbrated in PI 244:
How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn't seem to be
any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day,
and give them names? But how is the connexion between the
name and the thing named set up? This question is the same
as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names
of sensations?-—of the word pain for example. Here is one
possibility: words are connected with the pri.mi.ti.vex the
naturalj.. expressions of the sensation and used in their
Eilsce. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then
adults talk to him arid teach him excl_amations and, later,
cipnt pnrpc;_ Thpv fprh+ h F rhi 1 H ncauj r.-hoh-i r-u i k-
So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means
crying?— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain
replaces cryinq and does not describe it.
There are 3 questions being put forward in first paragraph.
They are s (i)How do words refer to sensations? (ii)How is
the .annexion between the name and the thinq named set up?
(iii)How does a human being learn the meaning of the names
of sensations? Wittgenstein treats them differently. For
(i), Wi 11genstei n r e j ects i t as unpr ob 1 emati ca 1—' t.her e
doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about
sensations every day, and give them names?' (ii) i»s
obviously a riposte provoked by Wittgenstein's reply to (i).
Saying that (ii) is 'the same as' (iii), Wittgenstein
ignores it and proceeds to answer (i ii). Are they really the
same? Definitely not, I venture to say, they actually are
distinct and incompatible because (iii) is in fact
Wittgenstein's methodological device to destroy
misconceptions.( See notes 16) On closer examination, it
is (i) which is the same as (ii): both are options within
the same erroneous picture, the 'object and designation
model' (F'I 293). Under this picture, words are meaningful
by virtue of correlating with(PI 1), standing for(F'I 1),
refering to (F'I 10), si gni f yi ng (F'I 13), being a label
of (PI 15), being associated with, effected by mental
pointing (F'I 36)remark abl e act of mind (PI 38)di recti ng or
concentrating our attention(PI 33) to objects, real or
ideal, physical or mental. Indeed, only under and within
this picture will questions like (i) and (ii) arise—a
primodialinitial split or separation between words(i.e.
language) and objests they stands, refer, etc(i.e. meaning)
underpins the whole picture, thus, questions like how is
the union of word and meaning effectedpossible acquire
their condition of existence.21 Hence, questions (i) and
(ii) will be deprived of their citizenship of being
legitimate problem outside the object and designation model.
That is why Wittgenstein's response to (i) is its denial as
being a problem. Likewise, the consequently total neglect of
(ii) by claiming it the same as (i i i) is by no means
accidental. To say (ii) the same as (iii) virtually means
that it carries no substance except being equivalent to
(iii)— this is a modest, if elliptical, dismissal. To
reject (i) and (ii), Wittgenstein means not only to
eradicate the whole family of similar kinds of questions,
but break with the very framework of thought within which
these questiions arise. He effects such a shift of viewpoint
by posing question (iii), a brandnew question bears clearly
the brand Wi ttgenstei ni an. liaxnaging to change the way of
looking at things, a clear view of the use of words emerges.
According to Wittgenstein, one of the ways we learn first-
person present-tense sensation sentences is to learn it as
sxciajmation, 'in place of the natural primitive expression
of sensation' and our mastery of I am in pain resides in
uttering it instead of crying, moaning, etc!, (So
Wittgenstein is justified in calling it 'verbal expression'
so as to distinguish it from those natural ones.) Pitcher
puts this point very nicelys
The child falls down or burns himself, and begins to cry or
scream; we comfort him with some such words as There,
there. I know it hurts, I know you have a pain now, but it
will soon be all right, and we, may try to relieve the pain
with medication, pills, or whatever. The child soon learns
that. the words I am in pain or I have a pain in my knee(
hands, wrist, tooth) are appropriate in this sort of
situation; and he learns that in these situations, if he
wants comforting or some relief of his condition, it is not
necessary to cry or groan or hold the affected part-— and
in fact, that in our culture the natural pain
behaviour(crying and so on) is approved of less and less as
one grows older. The same purposes can be achieved simply
by using the suitable words—I am in pain or I have a
pain in my toe..... Ihe sentence I am in pain has a use
similar to the words 'Ouch' and '0w'.22
It follows that' the differences between the propositions ..I
have pain and He has pain is not that of L.W. has pain
and Smith has pain. Rather it corresponds to the
differences between moaning and saying that someone
moans.'23 'There are many differences between moaning and
saying that someone moans. Moaning is a natural expression
or manifestation of pain. It does not describe pain,, it is
not true or false, it is not learnt, and it cannot be
operated upon with an epistemic operator to yield a
sentence. It is a natural, primitive kind of pain behaviour,
and that someone moans is a criterion for the truth of the
assertion that he is in pain. Saying that someone moans
differs on all these points. If the difference between I
have pain and He has pain corresponds to these
defferences, then, it seems, I have pain, though not a
natural pain expression, is not an object of possible
knowledge, is not a description, is not true or false, is an
acquired pain behaviour, and i,s A qua utterance a criterion
for the truth of the assertion that he is in pain.'24
Here, Wittgenstein's claim that doubt has no place in the
language-games of pain does not seem so indefensible as at
first sight. The force of the following reminder comes
c1 ear1y to surf ace:
One could from the beginning teach the child the expression
I think he has toothache instead of he has
toothache, with corresponding uncertain tone of voice.
This mode of expression could be described by saying that we
can only believe that the other has toothache.
But why not in the chi l cT s own case? Because there the
tone of voice is simply determined by nature(NFL p.259).
It is conceivable and possible to incorporate doubt into the
language-game of third-person sensation talk but definitely
not in the case of I am in pain. The waymode of teaching
as well as learning simply excludes doubt: How can the
natural expression of pain of child be uncertain? Can we
imagine a child moans in an uncertain tone of voice? What
would it be like to moan in doubt? Even if there exists such
queer 'uncertain cryingmoaning', will the adults regard the
child as having JBiJiD? and hurry to it? (and •teach it
exclamations and, later, sentences' on some occasions.)
Finally, Wittgenstein makes a concluding remarks
That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game;
but if we cut out human behaviour, which is the expression
of sensation, it looks as if I might legitimately begin to
doubt afresh. My temptation to say that one might take a
sensation for something other than what it is arises from
this: if I assume the sbrggati_on of the ngrmal
wi£t} the expression of a sensatign, I need a criterion of
identity for the sensat i on; and then the possibility of
error also existsCF'I 288).
With doubt not permissible in the normal language game
of I am in pain, it follows that any form of I know in
epistemic usage (e.g. 'Only I can know whether 7 I know
with greater certainty that...•) cannot be added to I am
in pain without producing a piece of nonsense.
What follows is a summing-up of the errors involved in
the erroneous wiew of epistemic privacy. The initial error
lies in overlooking the multiplicity of 1anguage-games. With
tii i-. i in:. the unfortunate tendency against which
Wittgenstein warns on F'I p. 180s. the relation: physical
object— sense-impressions. Here we have two different
language-games and a complicated relation between them— If
you try to reduce their relations to a simple formula you go
wrong.J Mistaking I am in pain for sentences like I have
5 shillings then resulted, regarding the former as 'a
description of inner state'. A further error creeps in:
misconstruing an asymmetry in our mode of expression (i.e..
doubt has no place in first-person sensation talk but not
for third-person sensation talk) as a mirror image of the
nature of the pain. Ripe for the emergence of epistemic
privacy as well as its character of depths utterances like
Only I know whether I am in pain must have said something
undeniably overwhelmingly true of pain; there can be no
truer statement than this— we simply can't imagine the
opposite! What would it be like if it were otherwise?25
What makes these nonsense (.I know+ I am in pain) strike
us as deep?(F'I 11) The secret of its depth lies in its
appearance— its assertoric form cripples our ability to
recognize its real nature: a grammatical statement
explaining the use of the word pain only (i.e. it says
nothing else). Nothing can be farther from truth than to
treat it as an empirical statment about the nature of pain.
Wittgenstein pinpoints this in F'I 247 and F'I 251:
Only you can know if you had that intention. One mi_ght
tell someone thi_s when one was explaining the meaning of the
word iintentigni to hi.m_». For then it means that is how we
use itjL (And here know means that the expression of
uncertainty is senseless.) (PI 247)
What does it mean when we say: I can't imagine the opposite
of this or What would it be like, if it were otherwise?—
For example,when someone has said that my. images are
private, or that only I myself can know whether I am feeling
pain, and similar things.
f course, here I can't imagine the opposite doesn't
mean: my powers of imagination are unequal to the task.
These words are a defence agafnst something whose form makes
i£ l99ii: 90 9figirfcaf grggosfti_onj_ but which is realty a„
.QC9ddD9.Li9.9i 909 (PI 251)-
The claimants of epistemic privacy stumble over the
distinction between grammatical (conceptual) and factual
statement- They are well-advised to note the following
remarkss
The essential thing about metaphysis: that the difference
between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear
to it. A metaphysical question is always in appearance a
•factual one., although the problem is a conceptual one. (RPP
v. 1 949)
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to
look at what happens as a proto-phenomenon. That is, where
we ought to have said: this language-game is played. (F'I
654)
The question is not one of exgl_ai_ni.ng a L9Q999g.9zg.9dl9 by
means of our exgeriences, but of noting a language-game. (F'I
655)
The concept of experince s Like that of happening, of
process, of state, of something, of fact, of description
and of report- Here we think we are standing on the hard
bedrock, deeper than any special methods and language-games.
But these extremely general terms have an extremely blurred
meaning. They relate in practice to innumerable special
cases, but that does not make them any solider; no, rather
it makes them more fluid( RPP v.1 648).
1-2 Privacy of ownership
Only I can have my pain.
Another person cannot have my pain.
Wittgenstein grapples with it in PI 253:
Another person can't have my pains. —Which are my pain?
What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what
makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak
of two exactly the same, for example,to say This chair is
not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same
as it,
The gist of Wittgenstein's argument is that
misunderstanding springs from obliterating the difference
between the grammatical and the factual (Z 458), regarding
a garmmatical statement which specifies -for the phrase my
pain a new usage which deviates from ordinary usage by
assimilating grammar of sense-impression into grammar of
physical objects as a factual statement about pain.
Actually, most of the blunders aforementioned recur here.
Wittgenstein's question (Which are my pain?) draws our
attention to the real nature of the statement under
consideration. It is not a statement of fact of pain, nor is
it an empirical generalisation. Another person can't have
my pain means: to say that heshe hasthey have my pain is
senseless. Just like the proposition Only this chair can be
green means it has no sense to say of another chair being
green(Rush p.4—5). But then the senselessness of heshe
hasthey have will render I have devoid of sense,
inasmuch as 'if as a matter of logic (ie grammar) you
exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense
to say that you have it'(F'I 398). Here, the initial
plausiblity of ownership of privacy evaporates! if I exclude
other's possibility of having this pain ie proclaiming
heshe hasthey have.. senseless, then I cannot be said
to have it, too, because the phrase I have... is equally
senseless in that the contrast between I have and they
haveheshe has became lost its point, depriving the phrase
I have(so are they haveheshe has) of the criteria of
usage. Utterances like Only I can have my pain is in
reality a disguised declarationproclamation to use a
certain form of expression or in Wittgenstein's term, 'the
avowal of adherence to a form of expression' (Z 442). This
disguise dresses it with a character of depth— we are
inclined to say, It is undoubtedly true! We can't imagine
its opposite! It is no doubt true that its opposite is
unthinkable because its opposite has been excluded at the
very outset by its very formulation:-
The avowal of adherence to a form of expression, if it is
formulated in the guise of a proposition dealing with
object(instead of signs) must be a priori. For its opposite
will really unthinkable inasmuch as there corresponds to it
a form of thought, a form of expression, that• we have
excluded (Z 442)»
Another facet of Wittgenstein's argument dwells upon
the paramount disanalogies in criterion of identity between
language-games of physical object and sense-impression. It
makes sense to say the chairs in 2 different rooms are of
the same colour. However, we do not say that these 2 chairs
are the same chair no matter how similar they are. (Imagine
someone says, Mrs Thatcher's chair is of the same colour,
is exactly the same as Mr Reagan's. But they are not the
same chair.) For physical objects, There is a is an
utterance that every kid knows. Equally plain is the
statement that This chair is red. Never There is red or
There is a red. Hence, if someone insists that 2
different chairs cannot have the same colour, at most they
look very similar (in colour) or the same colour cannot be
in different places at the same time (e.g. Red can't be in
2 places, say Thatcher's chair Reagan's chair), then he is
trying to g.iv.§. to a, col_our the same ki_nd of i_d.enti.ty which
we g.i.Y§l to a p.hysi_cal_ object._ His insistence will mean that
he is going to use JredJ differently -from the way in which
we use it. And then he cannot go on to say This chair is
red as he (and we) used to do, but There is (a) red inon
this chair or simply There is (a) red. (i.e. In the
fashion he talks about physical objects e.g.There is a
chair).(Rush p.5) Analogous cansideration applies to the
case of ownership privacy. Sentences like Another person
cannot have my pain or Only I can have my pain are
grammatical statement, an avowal, misguidedly framed as an
empirical proposition, to assimilate the grammar of
pain(sense-impression) into that of physical objects.(See
BE p. 55) Again, ownership of privacy rests on the
aborgation of normal language-game. 7 In so far as it makes
sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also
possible for us both to have the same pain,'(PI 253) says
Wittgenstein to remind us of the different criteria of
identity of the word pain and words like chair. Any form
of ownership of privacy is entirely untentable.
2. The Spell of Private Ostensive Definition
- I inwardly undertake to name this sensation, 'to
call THIS 'pain' in the future' (PI 263)
Wittgenstein started another strand of thought in F'I
256 which is directed against those adherents of private
language under the spell of a private ostensive definition.
In response to Wittgenstein's Expressive Thesis (i.e. words
of sensation are tied up with the natural expressions of
sensation), they offer the following rejoinders-
Suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the
sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply
associate names with sensations and use these names in
description (PI 256).Association is resorted to explain
the language-game. It should be noted that to explain a
language-game instead of noting one is one of the blatant
errors Wittgenstein repeatedly advises us to avoid.(PI
654,655 See p.33 above) Forestalling any detailed
examination of the actual ways in which our words are used,
it gives birth to the temptation of abrogating the normal
1anguage-games.
From PI 257 onward, the aforementioned version as well
as other variants of private ostensive definition are to
•fall under Wittgenstein's critical scrutiny. Worthy of
mention is Wittgenstein's immediate reformulation of his
adversary's question. In the opening sentence of PI 257,
Wi11genstein writes:
i
What would it be like if human beings show no outward signs
of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)? Then it would be
impossible to teach a child the use of the word
'toothache'.
Compared with his opponents' question, Wittgenstein's, is
more 'humble' with reference to a concrete example,
pain. This agrees well with his usual practice which has
the advantage of keeping in view a normal language-game,
avoiding the danger of being blinded from the real
functioning or use of words involved, and the consequent
abrogation of normal language-game. The fascinating appeal
of the private linguist' s argument s is due par11y to their
'purity and 'abstractness' a haze that makes clear
vision (of the working of normal language-game) less
possible,' if not impossible. This consideration applies
well to the notorious diarist argument below.
As a prelude to his onslaught, 2 guidelines are mapped
out in PI 257s-
(i) When one says He gave a name to his sensation one
forgets that a great deal of stagesetting in the
language-game is presupposed if the mere act of naming
is to make sense.
(ii) And when we speak of someone's having given a name to
pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the
grammar of the word pain.; it shows the post where
the new word is stationed.
Wittgenstein's employment of to make sense rather
than to be possible in predicating the phrase the mere
act of naming is indicates that he is pressing for an
objection of the most radical kind, one that shows his
opponents' thesis (To name a sensation by virtue of
association, etc) to be devoid of sense, that the very idea
of private ostensive definition is incoherent, a chimaera de
facto. This strategy can also be seen as catering for those
upholding private ostensive definition because of apparent
meaningfulness of the sentence To give a name to sensation
by.., etc
Before embarking on the notorious diarist argument
proper(PI 258), let lis make clear what purposes those 2
guidelines mapped out in PI 257 serve. They are designed to
remind, and thus disabuse, us of misconceptions concerning
naming. The term stagesetting is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that naming is not simply label
attaching (F:'I 26), nor does it consist in 'correlating in a,
parti cliI ar and rather mysterious way a sound (or other sign)
with samething' (BB p.172),rendering how we make use of this
peculiar correlation becomes uni mportant. (BB p. 172; F I 33)
These misconceptions stem from the deep-seated error of not
noting the multiplicity of language-games forgetting we
call very different things names; the word name is used
to characterise many different kinds of use of a word,
related to one another in many different ways'.(PI 38)
With this negligence comes the primitive philosophy which
unjustifiably condenses the whole usage of the name into the
idea of a single relation, often a oversimplified relation
such as label attaching. But this label attaching action,
Wittgenstein stresses, can at best be 'preparatory to the
use of a word'(PI 26). Mere painting certain strokes
(e.g.S) on the forehead of a person does not automatical1y
make these strokes become his name. They become so, say,
when the person having been trained to run up to someone who
calls out those strokes. The connection between a name and
tin- 'king named is established, not just by mere act of
naiTiingpointi ng tothe thi ng named, but by the parti cular
role it plays in the practice of our language.(BB p.172)
There can be no greater difference between a 5 simply
drawn on the forehead than a S with a role in our life,
in subs e q u e n t a c t ivities, one t h at we c a n d o s o m e t h :i. n g w :i. t h
(in the future)(PI 31). (We might well think the former
S is a stain, exclaiming, What a coincidence! This stain
looks so like the word S,) The importance of' (the
possibility of) being a part of an activity' cannot be
overemphasized in Wittgenstein's thinking:-
Here the term language-game is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of
an activity, or a form of life(PI 23).
This echoes his slogan 'the meaning of a word is its use
in the language'(PI 43). A sign without a use cannot be a
mea;;i:.gful sign.
The label attaching conception errs not .only in
misleading us into thinking that there is only one single
(and simple) relation between all sorts of names, but also
in misrepresenting the naturefunction of the pointing
(gesture)mere act of naming as if it were a magic
power, can by itself alone give life to a lifeless sign in a
single act. Without doubt pointing does play a part, but
only in conjunction with a great deal of supporting
stagesetting can it have any effects and again these vary
with circumstances and the ways we dispose of it(PI
7,33). Consider the differences between Koh-i-noor, the
name of a diamond and the name of a person. For instance,
'I can call a person by his name, as I can't with the name
of a diamond'(Rush p.4). Even a glimpse of the diverse uses
and functions of names is enough to make us wonder how this
pointing gesture alone can effect all these utterly
heterogenous uses. Indeed, without assimilating all the
different uses into the blanket term 'label', the whole idea
of a magic pointing will completely lose its appeal,
inasmuch as we realize the whole importance lies in the
particular use we subsequently make of the correlation(BB
p172-173). What i f that magic act makes a sign an
'unremovable label' of something? However;, it makes great
difference if we equate label to uses, and then to meaning.
This unwarranted equation tricks.
When faced with such lunatic conception of naming, in
line with the above account, the typical Wittgensteinian
response will be questions like 'What purpose does the word
serve?', 'What is.the point of uttering the word?', 'What
can I do with the word? In what game?', 'Is it enough for
this purpose to concentrate your attention on...?'
Let us now examine the diarist argument. It runs as
fol1ows 2
I want to keep a diary about the recurranee of a certain
sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign S and
write this sign in a calender for every day on which I have
the sen sation. (PI 258)
When the meaningfulness of the sign S is under fire, the
diarist has recourse to several ways 2 (i) giving himself an
ordinary ostensive definition and (ii) concentrating his
attention on the sensation so as to a) point to it inwardly
and b) impress on himself the connexion between the sign and
the sensation(PI 258).
To (i), Wittgenstein replies, How? Can I point to the
sensation? Not in the ordinary sense(PI 258). Apparently,
Wittgenstein deems it misleading to call the mechanism of
association to be an ostensive definition of the sign S as
it involves no 'pointing to the sensation' in the ordinary
sense. Not seeing the full thrust of his attack resides in
thee phrase 'in the ordinary sense', those private linguists
offer the •followina rejoinder:
But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I
concentrate my attention on the sensation— and so as it
were, point to it inwardlyCF'I 258).
•But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it
seems to be', queries Wittgenstein(PI 258), raising
objection as to how the attention-concentrating action can
establish a use for S and turn it into a genuine name.
Once again comes into play the erroneous 1abel-attaching
conception of name. Wittgenstein repeats his warning
numerous times, yet, the? advocates of private ostensive
definition keep in forgetting that 'a great deal of
stagesetting in the language is presupposed if the mere act
of naming is to make sense'(PI 257).
This forgetfulness is actually the inclination to
aborgate normal language-games—to reduce the grammar of
sense-impressions .into that of physical objects. The
profound disanalogies between these 2 types of language-
games have been pinpointed repeatedly in Wittgenstein's
Expressive Thesis and else where, only to be greeted by
being constantly overlooked. This overlook crystallizes
condenses into the dream of a private ostensive definition
and accounts for its irresistable appeal— to construe
sense-impressions in the fashion of physical objects like
chairs or tables, conceiving an ostensive definition, say,
pain following the example of table or chair. Had his
opponents appreciated his reminder wrapped in the phrase
'not in the ordinary sense', they would have not offered so
many futile rejoinders and remained captive of a series of
blunders. With the following remark, we can view his
reminder 'not in the ordinary sense' in the full light:-
The words 'seeing red means a particular experiences' are
useless unless we can follow them up by :'namely this—
(pointing). Or else they may say experience as opposed to
physical objects: but then this is grammar(NFL p.244).
Wittgenstein's point is that if sensation words share the
same grammar as that of physical objects, then the procedure
of ostensive definition for a sensation should be similar to
that of physical objects: an explanationdefinition+
(pointing to, etc) a sample. Can we follow our explanation
up by 'namely this—(pointing)' in the cases of sense-
impressions? If not, it should be clear that it is by no
means valid to construe the grammar of sense-impressions in
the fashion of physical objects.
Likewise, sentences like 'S means the sensation I now
associate withnow concentrate my attention to' are useless
in that they neither establish the meaningfulness of S nor
make it a genuine name, even if sensations can be conceived
after physical objects ,not to mention that they cannot. The
whole issue of private ostensive definition is then put into
perspective: utterances purported to be ostensive definition
of sensations can at best be grammatical statements
explaining that certain words are to be used for non-
physical objects ie sensations. The whole confusion may
arise in this way: One hears on many occasions, say, a
lesson in which the teacher corrected his pupils and said,
You should not use pain like that! Pain means a
particular sensation!7 One then left out the -first part o-f
the sentence, forgot the original language-game which endows
it with meaningfulness. Wow then all sentences in the form
:'Xa name of any sensations)- means a particular
sensations7 sound meaningful to us in their own right, in
whatever occasions.26 The final step of the trick is
completed when we come to think that the X above can be a
7 sign7 invented at will by us and that the sentence is an
ostensive definition of the X we coined. Unwittingly
aborgating the normal language-games is the mastermind of
the 'conspiracy7 of a private ostensive definition.
With the above-mentioned in mind, the last resort
concentrating my attention and impressing on myself the
connexion between the sign and the sensation— used by his
opponents in PI. 258 can make no appeal on us. Equally plain
is Wittgenstein's criticism: 7 But I impress it on myseTf
can only mean: this process brings it about that I should
%
re;,;, .nber the connexion right in the future. But in the
present case I have no criteria of correctness(PI 258). It
is just a restatement of his criticism that the 2
r equi rements ofan authentic narne— the possi bi 1 i ty to be
used in the future and the existence of criteria of usage
can never be met by the sign S, a meaningless sign by
dest i ny.
There exists an interpretation suggesting that
Wittgenstein here provokes the problem of memory. So
interpreted, Wittgenstein was blamed for being unreasonably
skeptical of our memory27 To say he has no faith in our;
memory, 'I contend, does no justice to him— qui 1 ty of
confusing 2 levels of problem of memory, one of which is
permissable in his framework, whereas the other is entirely
allien to his thinking. Anticipating such misunderstanding,
the first, rate thinker elaborates these 2 levels of problem
of memory elsewheres-
I cannot remind myself in my private language that this was
the sensation I called red. Jhere is no syestion of my
£'§I()9EY.L.§ 109 S trick— because (in such a case) there
can be no criteron for its playing me a trick. If we lay
down rules for the use of a colour words in ordinary
language, then we can admit that memory plays tricks
regarding these rules (Rush p.. 8).
Those 2 levels of problem, as outlined above, are (i)
remembering a meaningful sign and (ii) remembering a 'sign
without a use or established rule of usage.
As for one with established rules of usage,
Wittgenstein makes it clear that the problem of memory 'is
legitimate. And that this sense of problem of memory is out
of place here is also equally clear. For Wittgenstein, the
rneaningfulness or the existence of rule of usage for S is
p r ec i se 1 y t h e issue an d b efor e this is settied, the question
of remembering or misremembering simply has no right to
ex i s t„ How p o i. n t less won Id it be to disc uss t h e remember i n g
of something whose existence has yet to be demonstrated?
Actually, it is more than obvious that he is pushing at the
meaninglessness of S as manifested in remark 258 and those
following it28 e.g. remark 260s—
Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again.--
Perhaps, you believe that you believe it.
Then did the man who made the entry in the calender
make a note of nothing whatever?— Don't consider it a,
matter of course that a person is making a note of something
when he makes a mark~— say in a calender. For a note has a
function, and this S so -far has none.
Despite his explicitness, his position is still mistaken as
to query only the remembering of S but not its
meaning-fulness. This misreading is really symptomatic and
revealing— the advocates of this misinterpretation are
themselves prisoners of the misguided thinking. They project
what they take for granted— the meaning-fulness of S—
into Wittgenstein's and accuse him of looking down upon our
memory. Blinded by their own position, they confuse problem
(i) and (ii), the anti~Wittgenstein nature of which escaped
their notice as expected. Problem (ii) may take several
formss-
a. Can memory help us to recognize it when the same
sensation occurs? -(Recognition)- (NFL p.245)
b. Can memory tell us whether we are really having the same
sensation again? Identity (NFL p.246)
c. Can we remember right the connexion between the sign and
these nsatio
d. Can recourse to association'laser-1ike' attention, etc
help to secure the memory of this connexion? (PI
258,263)
It is immediately evident that problem (ii) goes against his
Expressive Thesis. It embodies all the blunders criticised
above—to conceive sensation words in term of label-
attaching conception of naming... etc. Under the Expressive
Iheis, all questions concerning the connexion between a
sign and the corresponding sensation simply cannot arise as
the normal language-games do not function in this way.
As the above discussion goes, we see that Wittgenstein
has not and will not pose problem (i) i.e. the issue of
memory with respect to a sign with estab1ished usage, then
what about problem (ii)? He does have posed it. This may
arouse our suspicion as to the correctness of the above
interpretation. He poses the anti—Wittgensteinian question,
problem (ii), when he is moving into his enemy's territory,
taking up their point o-f departure, pushing it to its
logical extreme and showing its inadequacy. Conceiving under
the 1abel-attaching conception of naming necessarily gives
rise to questions of identity and recongnition of the same
sensation,which are doomed to be unsolvable. Yet, his
adversary 'solve' it by tacitly replacing (ii) by (i),
resulting in their complaint of Wittgenstein's unwarranted
skepticism. This totally misses the point. The replacement
is 'understandable' tor those who have not yet awaken trom
the dream of regarding sensation words as labels ot
sensation. The dream stands in the way to demarcate these 2
levels of problem of memory.
So much tor the misreading ot Wittgenstein's assault.
In F'I 261, he evacuates the apparent meaning-fulness of all
claims ot having made a private ostensive definition:-
What reason have we tor calling S the sign tor a
sensation? For sensaUonf is a word ot our common la.Qay9.ej_
not ot one LQtel_l_i_gi_bl_e to me afone._ So the use of thi_s word
stands i_n need of a ±ustfffeatfon everybody
understands.— And it would not help either to say that it
need not be a sensation;that when he writes S, he has
something-— and that is all that can be said.. Has and
something also belong to our common language.— So in
the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point
where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.
Making private ostensive definition is an entirely misguided
enterprise. It simply cannot be 'expressed' without
unwitting.ly aborgating normal language-game. Because of the
purported privacy, it cannot get a footing in our public
language. Emitting an inarticulate sound is the fate of
those? doomed private diarists.
In F'I 270 and F'l 271 Wittgenstein rounds up the
discussion. His tenet is that when sensation words are? taken
as what they really are,, all the difficulties surrounding
the private ostensive definition— problem of memory,
identity, recognition— simply do not arises-
Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign S in my
diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular
sensation a manometer shews that my blood-pressure is rising
without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. And
now jit seems guite indifferent whether I have recognized the
sensatjl on r i ght 22 Dot Let us suppose I r eguf ar 1. y identify
it wrong.1. it does not matter in the feast And that alone
shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake i_s mere
show.....
And what is our reason for calling S the name of a
sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign .is
employed in this language-game.— And why a fpartfeufar
sensatignf x that fSj. the same one every time? Weff A arerrft
we supposing that we wr'fte every time? (F'I 270)
The same query directed at private diarists in F'I 261
is now dismissed as unproblematic— In our normal language-
game, it is bypassed. The private diarists' picture is up¬
side-down? we write S every time so it is the same
s e n s a t i o n e v e r y t i rn e?-- t h e h y p o t h e s is of m a k i n g a m i s t a k e
is mere show(F'I 270). So is the problem of memorys-
Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the
word 'pain' meant— so that he constantly called different
things by that name-- but nevertheless used the word in a
way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions
of pain— in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should
like to say :a wheel that can be turned though nothing else
moves with it, is not part of the mechanism(PI 271).
Whether we can remember the sensations named is not part of
the rnechani sm of playi ng the norma 1 langugae of sensati ons
— its functions does not require this.
There are still 2 variants of private language that
Wittgenstein denounces;, namely (i) every senation word has 2
meaning one public and the other private(PI 273) and (ii)
one knows what the word pain means only from one's own
pain and one's own caseCPI 293,295). They are said to be
variants because resting on the same wrong-headed picture of
functioning of sensation words —signs on one side and
private sensations on the other. In view of the ample
discussion on the inadequacy of this misguided picture above
I consider it unnecessary to go deep into Wittgenstein's
treatment of it. To end this chapter, I cite the famous
'beet1e-in-the-box' argument, which echoes PI 270 and PI
271:
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from
his own case!— Suppose everyone had a box with something in
it s we call it a beetle. No one can look into anyone
else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only
by looking at his beetle.— Here it would be quite
possible for everyone to have something.different in his
box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly
changing.— But suppose the word beetle had a use in
these people's language?-— If so it would not be used as the
name of a thing. The thing LQ the box has no place in the
i§.Q9.y.§9.§.ZQ.§.(!li: s't alii, not even as a something: for the box
might even be empty.-— No, one can 'divide through' by the
thing in the box 5 it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to says jf we construe the grammar of the
exgressjgn of sensation on the model 2f fobject and
designation! the object drags out of consideratjon as
lOCOioyant(PI 293).
Our investigation is therefore a
SOsOOsticial. one. Such an investigation
sheds light on our problem by clearing
misunderstanding away.Mi sunderstandings
concerning the use of words, caused
among other things., by certain
analogies between the forms of
expression in different regions of
language. F'I 90
Are you not really a behaviourist in
disguise? Aren't you at bottom really
saying that everything except human
behaviour is a fiction?—If I do speak
of a fiction, then it is of a
grammatical fiction. F'I 307
Chapter 3
Wittgenstein's Case :Doctor or Patient?
The worry of being misunderstood haunted Wittgenstein.
However plain he makes his position, he is still
misunderstood. Of the pieces of misunderstanding
Wittgenstein anticipated, behaviourism1 is the most
pertinent here, which, ironically, is the crime he is after
said to be committina.
To facilitate discussion, let us first lay down the
senses of the term 'behaviourism
i) Ontological Behaviouris - doctrines that deny that
Cartesian inner happenings
exist at all.
ii) Linguistic Behaviourism theories that hold that
7 nothing can be? said about
private' experience7. 2
To epitomize Wittgenstein's labour in the private
language enterprise by 7 the normal language-game is not like
that7 is not wrong but underestimates the scope of his
concern, A wider concern is reflected in his own epitome—
All I want to say is that it is misleading to say that the;
word 7-fright7 signifies something which goes along with the
experience of expressing fright.(NFL P.233) His real target
is Cartesianism3 7 The idea of the ego inhabiting a body
to be abolished7 (NFL p.239). With this misguided picture
comes the inclination to take language-games of sensations
as what they are not. We are tempted to think in this case
there is an inside in the normal sense, say,, the inside of a
box. Thus, letting others know what one sees should go like
inviting others to look inside him. But that is not the way
our language works, Wittgenstein reminds us, to show what
one sees is to point to somethings-
7 If he had learned to show me (or tell me) what he sees, he
could now show me? Certainly—but what is it to show me
what he see? It is qointing to something, under B.arti_cul_ar
LCCumstances. Or is it something else (don't be misled by
the idea of indirectness)?
You compare it with such a statement ass 7 If he had
learned to open up, I could now see what's inside.7 I say
yes, but remember what oqening uq in. this case i_s LLRe (NFL
p.238).
There is no opening up in the present case, so the metaphor
7inside-outside7 should not be taken too far. Here, the
importance of getting clear about how the metaphors of
7 outside-inside7, 'direct-indirect', 'external-internal' and
inner process are actually applied is highlighted. Now it
should be clear that it is the misapplied metaphors and
misleading pictures that Wittgenstein is rejecting The
impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our
setting our faces against the picture of the liQner
explains Wittgenstein, What we deny is that the
picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of
the word to remember. We say that this picture with its
ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the
word as it is. (F'I 305) Once again his remarks that his
investigation is grammatical(PI 90) and that he rejects
nothing except grammatical fiction(PI 307) born out.
In reality, the most wrong-headed ever is to attribute
the behaviourist instance to Wittgenstein. He knows more
than anyone about the antagonism between Cartesianism and'
Behaviourism. He sets out to explain the origin of this
futile enterprise in PL 308::-
How does the philosophical, prgbiem about mentai processes
and states and about behaviourism arise?— The first step is
the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes
and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall
know more about them— we think. But that is just what
commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For
we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know
a process better.(The decisive movement in the conjuring
trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought
quite innocent— And now the analogy which was to make us
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny
the yet unc o mp r eh ended process in the yet unexplored medium.
And now it looks as if we had denied mental process. And
naturallv we don't want to denv them.
According to Wittgenstein, Cartesians and behaviourists are
much more intimate(theorectically) than appearance suggests.
Their disputes are actually family affairs' since both
parties revolve around the same axis —the problematic inner-
process (RPP v.1 580)4, the point of departure and
theorectical domain mapped out by Cartesians. These
theorectical twins' are' theorectical complements-'' to each
others Cartesians assert the inner process, behaviourists
deny it? the former emphasize the 'inside internal', the
latter cares the 'outside external'. Yet, behaviouists'
revolt in no way cuts their Cartesian breeding: their
'outside' exist only as the 'beyond' of 'the Cartesian
'inside', the boundary of which is drawn exclusively by
Cartesians. Likewise, behaviouristic conception of
behaviour is just a complement, negation, denial,
opposition, 'beyond' of that of the Cartesian inner process.
Being the shadow of Cartesianism, the behaviouristic
conception of behaviour bears the stamp of the same
misplaced analogy, inside—outside. Unsurprisingly, its
adequacy is criticised Severely by Wittgenstein
Take the various psychological phenomena: thinking, pain,
anger, joy, wish, fear, intention, memory etc— and cornpare
the behaviour corresponding to each— But what does
behaviour include here? Qnl_v the play of facjlal. expression
and the postures? (Or also the surrounding, so to speak- the
occasion of this expression? And if one does include the
surrounding as well, how is the behaviour to be compared
in the case of anger and in that of memory, for example?)
(RPP v.1 129)
The behaviourist conc ep tion meets with great difficulties,
e.g. comparison of behaviour. These can be avoided in his
own conception
The behaviour of humans includes of course not only what
they do without ever having learned the behaviour, but also
what they do (and so, e.g.say) after having received a
training. And this behaviour has its importance in relation
to the special training— If e.g., someone has learnt to
use the words I am -frightened, we 5hal_l_ draw unlkg
conclusions from like behaviour(RPP v. 1 131).
I think' the foregoing discussion has already demonstrated
that Wittgenstein theorizes in a domain transcending that of
Cartesianism and its shadow, thus proving that he is far
•from an orrtological behaviourist,.
In the realm of theory of meaning, the above antagonism
generates several variants of so—called (i) Linguistic
Cartesianism and (ii) Linguistic Behaviourism. They can be
put as follows2-
(1a) Sensation words become meaningful by virtue of
standing for, denoting, referring to..., etc
Cartesian inner happenings.
(lb) Sensation words say about the inner.
(1a) Sensation words become meaningful by virtue of
standing for, denoting, describing, referring to
behaviour.
(1b) Sensation words do not say anything about the inner
happenings or process.
It would be very short a step, when coupled with notions
such as privileged accessbarrier, for Linguistic Cartesians
to turn into private linguists. Does Wittgenstein resort to
linguistic behaviourism to counter it as suggested by his
critics? Unless he is quilty of hopeless inconsistency, or
else, how would he on the one hand repudiate the point of
departure and the theorecti c'al domain associated, and on the
other adopt options within the very same domain assailed?
Realizing the cause of illness is one thing, immunity the
other? If we still have doubt on Wittgenstein's novelty,
having a look at his positive account of the language-game
of pain may h01p«
His general position on language can be put in this
ways our prevailing conceptual structure and language-games
agree with' genera1 facts of nature' (PI p.230; RPR v.1
45-48, 643), and 'our form of life (F:,I 23). As for those
facts of nature upon which rests our normal language-game of
pain, Wi11genstein hints at in Z 5403-
It is a help to remember that it is a erim;Ltyye reaction to
tend, to treat the part that hurts when someone else is in
pain 5 and not merely when oneself is— and so to pay
attention to other people's pain-behaviour, as one does not
pay attention to one's own pain-behaviour(Z 540).
The key term is 'primitive' and Wittgenstein clarifies
immediately its meaning in the next remark:
But what is the word 'primitive' meant to say here?
Presumably that this sort of behaviour is pre-1inguistic:
that a language-game is based on it, that it is the
BL'otgtype of a way of thinking and not the result of
thought.(Z 541)
Then what kind of language-game is based on our primitive
reaction behaviour .to pain? Of course, it is the
language-game of pains
Suppose someone explains how a child learns the use of the
word 'pain' in the following ways When the child behaves in
such-and-such a way on particular occasions, I think he's
feeling what I feel in such cases and if it is so then the
child associates the word with his feeling and uses the
word when the feeling reappears— What does this explanation
explain?— Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting
whether he is and so on, are so many natural, instinctive,
kinds of behaviour towards other human beings and our
language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension
of, this relation. Our I§03uageygame i_s an extrnygn of
12LiH'itiye_2 behaviour.(For our 1 anguage-game i_s behaviour],
(2 545)
It should be clear by now why Wittgenstein claims in PI 244
that 'they(i.e.the adults) teach the child new pain-
behaviour' when teaching him the language-game of pain since
our normal language-game of pain is an extension of our
primitive pain behaviour. In remarks 281-290, Wittgenstein
has more to say about the peculiar features of the language-
g ames of sen sat i on s s-
But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no
pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?—It comes to
this: only of a living human being and what resembles
(behaves like) a living human being can one says it has
sensations; is blind; hear; is deaf; is conscious or
unconscious.(PI 281)
Wittgenstein stresses that it is a fact of our language that
'only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it
has pains'(PI 283). He substantiates further this point by
provoking a thought experiment —ascribing pain to a stone
and a wriggling fly:
Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.—One says
to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of
ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe
it to a number!—And now look at a wriggling fly and at once
these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a
foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too
smooth for it. (PI 284).
The difference in reactions, Wittgenstein pinpoints, stems
from our instinctive attitude to what is alive and what is
dead. Similarly, when answering the question 'what makes it
plausible to say that it is not the body that feels pain',
once again, Wittgenstein draws our attention to a fact of
our human natuaral history that 'if someone has a pain in
his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it write)
and one does not comfort the handj. but the suffereri one
looks into his -face.' (PI 286)
Here we see that one is certainly in the wrong to
attribute a behaviourist stance to Wittgenstein and that
any private language' is a dream as it does not have .a
foothold 'in our instinctive reactions or natural histoy. Any
proponents of alternative language-games will bear the
unenviable task of showing their compatabiliy with our form
of life.( Hence, the discussion of the possibility of
private rule in this context is as futile as the problem of
memory. We should abandon the bad habit of being abstract:
just focusing on the alternative language-game itself and
speculating on its plausibility. Instead, we should be more
'down-to-earth' and ask Does the alternative language-game
we envisage agree with our natural history, form of life or
network of instinctive responses and reactions?)
Chapter 4
Review of Wittgenstein's Critic-Patients
In this chapter I set out to describe a discursive
pattern, part or whole of which., can be found in
Wittgenstein's critics. An explanation will then be
offered. The explanation will go in this direction: the
pattern is symptomatic of their being held captive by
muddles involved in the private language issue.
The pattern consists of several concomitant stages:
1 Obsessed with criticizing the alleged ambiguous
definition of private language 'offered' in PI 243.
O
Rushing to the diarist argument and the like.
, Misreading :problem of memorv.
4 Mischaracterization: linguistic behaviourism,
verificationist theory of meaning.
Not seeing that Wittgenstein's concern lies not so much
in providing a definition as in laying bare the misleading
notions and wrong-headed pictures involved, many critics
like Mund 1 e oornplains about the arnbi gui ty of the' unf or tune
definition' as if Wittgenstein never awares the.intricacy of
the issue.1 Curiously enough, his effort in PI 243 to
clarify the problem (See Chapter 1 above) is totally
ignored;; his critics concentrate on the last 3 sentences
only. In fact, he more than anyone sees the source o-F
difficultes of the issue— the abundance o-F loaded words
and concepts such as the notion 'private'. When used in the
ordinary sense;, it is as all right as all other notions but
is no longer so when one is philosophizing and -falls prey to
the erroneous B.L£.ty.1l§.ili.Q§Ld§z9.l=itsLd.§l §Q.d li.n_ner process;_)_
it Lnexorabl_y repeats.
Obsessed with the 'ambiguity', his critics -fail to pay
due attention to his subsequent discussion of the? notion of
privacy and other muddles. This costs them much. Being
distracted from what is really significant, they get
victimized in the medium of all the problematic notions such
as 'private' (in those 2 senses Wi ttgenste?i n repudiated
above), 'refer to', 'name'(in non—trivial sense i.e. under
the 1 abel --attach i ng conception),' inner' (wrapped in the
misplaced analogy 'inside-outside'), etc.2 This prompts
them to misrepresent Wittgenstein's position and produce a
host of vain attempts to 'clarify' what Wittgenstein means.
For instance, Mundle proposes the following distinctions for
the question 'Can there be a private language?':
a. Can a person meaningfully talk to himself about (use
words or other symbols to refer to) his own private
ex periences?
b. Can a person tell others anything about his private
experiences?
c. Can there be a language whose rules are kept secret by
their inventor (irrepective of what this language is used
to talk about)?3
The above distinctions come from Mundle's understanding of
Wittgenstein's position which he -formulates as follows:
that private experiences can have no place in the
1 anguage-'game, i.e. that we cannot (logically) talk about
private experiences.(Notice that my last sentence is an
appropriate way of formulating Wittgenstein's conclusion
only if 'talking about x' is used, as I shall use it,
literally, i.e. as involving referring to x. A
behaviourist could of course formulate his thesis by saying,
not 'we cannot talk about private experiences', but 'people
do of course talk about e.g. their pains, but what they
are then doing is not referring to anything private, but
referring to, or exhibiting, pai n--behav:i. our'.) 4
Does Wittgenstein question our everyday practice of
talking about our feelings etc? Of course he does not. It
is only the 'degenerate construction of private experience'
that is his target.(See chapter 1) NyDdle not only
JDii§reeresents his positi on but al so employs ail those
Problematic notions such as lreferri.ng tgi and Iptiyatei«
This results from his mistaking Wittgenstein's intention in
PI 243 and thus the consequent overlook of his penetrating
criticism of the problematic notions and picture. His
distinctions made above may be brilliant in their own right
but is totally off the right track from.the very outset. It
is his distinctions, which underpin the-erroneous picture,
rather than Wittgenstein's that is really unfortunate.
Worthy of mention is that Wittgenstein never himself ,as
bundle unjustifiably ascribes to him, words the issue as
'can there be a private 1anguage?'5 If he ever poses it,
his an swer will c ertain1y be: 'that depends on what you mean
by private. If in ordinary sense, why not?6 However, if
you take it as those 2 banal senses assailed, then I would
confidently say you are wrong and I would help you to right
your wrong by carrying out grammatical investigation of our
normal 1 a'nguage-qame.
Their position blinds them the significance of
dicussion of privacy so they 'naturally' sidestep it and
rush to the diarist argument immediately after blaming
Wittgenstein for vagueness, As regard the argument, they
invariably envisaging it as a problem of memory or
unwarranted s kept ism of other sorts,, 7 Finally,
Wittgenstein's so-called mistake is explained by ascribing a
behaviourist stance, ontological or linguistic to him. Their
systematic mi sinterpretation is not without cause; it is
only a reflection or manifestion of their private linguist
position. As expected,, the diarist argument receives
greatest attention because there one can find the most
favourable condition for the illusiion of a private
languages the i ntel 1igib1e-to-oneself~alone 'private' realm
inside plus a referring-to mechanism Iabel-attaching
conception of name. So when Wittgenstein offers the therapy
that when used in ordinary sense, the notion 'private' does
not signify an unintelligible-to-other inner realm8• and
that sensation words are not labels of sensations(When
conceived in the' name and object mode1', tne object
sensation drops out as irrelevant.), they symptomatical1y
misunderstand him as denying the inner or the possibilty of
talking about it. As the implication and invalidity of this
misreading has been discussed above, I shall not repeat it
her e.
Lastly, I cite the following remark as an ending for
this papers
One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at
its use and learn from that.
But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which
stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid
p r e j ud i c e (PI 340).
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Kripke questions this. See Kripke, p.2.
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C.f. NFL. p. 252- 253 where a similar case is considered.
Hallett, p.328.
Upon the epistemic use of 'know', the nature of doubi
and related issues, which are indispensable for
understanding Wittgenstein's point here (i.e. PI 246),
rely on the conclusions established in his later work,
'On Certainty', which? I draw heavily from secondare












. Hacker, p.. 244- 245.,
. polk, p. 166...; i
. Cook, p. 298.'
. I admit that my formulation of. this sentence is
misleading as it suggests that Wittgenstein is putting
forth a (empirical) .thesis about experience, disputinc
within the same theorectical horizon with those private
linguists. As I am sure.' the context will make ii
snfficeptly clear that it should never be taken in this
•t 1• I I••
16. We, with utmost ease or even naturally, regard 'I have a
toothache' to be meaningful as long as we have nc
difficulty in imagining a meaningful context(i.e. the
language-game which is its original home) to fit it.(
C.f. the case of 'I know' above. See p.17)
According to Wittgenstein, it is the most usual
mistake when 'philosophising' to abstract a sentence
from its original hpme, and then concentrating on this
9 homeless' serrtepce alone (i.e. paying no attention tc
'its original uses in its original home), drawinc
'irresponsibly' or interoretino 'as we Dlease'
i 11 eg j. t i mat e conc: 1 usi n (s) f r m it, j ust 1 i ke £he
present case.. Facing such cases., Wittgenstein's usual
strategy is to invite us to look into the occasions
under which this sentence has uses. Condensed into a
piece of methodological advice, it runs as follows:
.one must always ask oneself: is the word ever
actually used in this way in the language-game which is
its original home?—
What we do is to bring words back from their
metaphysical to their everyday use(PI 116).
You say to me: 'you understand this expression, don't
you? Well then-—I am using it in the sense you are
familiar with.'—As if the sense were an atmosphere
accompanying the word, whi_ch it. carried wi_th i_t i_ntg
every ki nd of and 1 i cat i on.
.he should ask himself in what special
Circumstances this sentence is actually u~?ed. There it
dnP5 make sensetPI 1 i 7).
I mean:—Where and how will such a
sentence be used? When I ask What sense does it
make?—I want someone answer me not with a picture or a
series of pictures,but with the descritption of
i t 11 a+ i nn c= (RPP v.. 1 1 ?m7)„
.what is meant by 'I 'm cutting red into bits' is
senseless is first and foremast that this expressior
doesn't belong to the particular game its appearance
makes it seem to belong to(PG p.. 126).
One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ash
how we were taught it. Doing this on the one hanc
destroys a variety of misconceptions, on the other hanc
g i v e s y o i a p r i m i t i v e la n g uage i n w h i c h t h e w o id i s
used. Although this language is not what you talk wher
you are twenty, you get a rough approximation l:o uhal
17. Coinaoe of Hacker. I shall elaborate it later'
18. By the distinction 'physical object' and' nori-phys j. cal
object', I don't mean to uphold that there are only 2
types of descriptions, which undoubtedly goes against
Wittgenstein's position. But for our present purpose,
this distinction will suffice and can do as well as more
subtle and strict classification or distinction.uuxe ci iu s u. r .l c x. i assi 1i cat l on or distinction.
19. I employ the term 'mostly' because failure to notice the
two and assimil aton of the former to the 1atter, and so
n) does not 1ogica11y fo11ow from regarding I have
toothache as description. And Wittgenstein takes to
task only those who not only regrad it as description
but also conflate the two, and so on. However, it does
not mean that they are not inti mate 1 y reI. aLud, in
Wittgenstein's opinion, they actully are the integral
parts of a picture. If it held us captive, the
temptation to look at things in this way will be
irresistable to us because 'we could not go outside
It'(PI 115)
20
Upon tho mi sconcept .i. on of first -person present-1ense
sensation sentences as desorip tion of inner senses, t wo
a1TeRnative and contradictory doctrines can be bui11 up:
1 Corrigibility of "I have toothache" and (ii)
incorrigibility of I have toothache. This all depends
on what additional premise (about corrigibi1ity of
identification of sensation) we adopt. For those hold
that we have absolute certainty in identifying
sensations will favour (ii), otherwise (i). For our
present purpose, we put aside (ii) and concentrate on
(i), which, actually, Wittgenstein in the least
concerns, if any. Because (ii) can be abused by
advocates of private language as an evidence of privacy
of sensations, Wi11genstein discusses it at 1ength.
Though we deal only with (i) in the present moment, our
arguments against (i) applies also to (ii) as both rest
on same point of departure: first-person present-tense
sensation sentences are description of inner senses.
21
Indeed, the split or separation between language and
meaning is one of the central contentions Wittgenstein
tries hard.to undermine. It entails that language and
meaning are distinct categoriesrealms and leads to a
host of search of foundation for language i.e. unifying
language and meaning either by provoking a third
cateaorv which Guarantees the union of the 2 or
identifying something which is are al1 eged to be meani ng
per se or the source origin of meaning. Facing these
friutless theories of meaning, Wittgenstein proclaims
autonomy of grammar and directs passionate criticisms to





BB, p„68. Quoted in Hacker, p. 257.
Hacker, p., 257.
c.f. PI 252s- This body has extension. To this we
might reply sNonsense! but are inclined to' reply
Of course! Why is this?
26 , This is one of the ever—presept muddles Wittgenstein
takes great pain to lay bare. An ordinary sentence like
'Pain means a particular sensation' is originally a
move in a special game and it is meaningful all by
virtue of being a move in such a game. Metaphysical
nonsense and abuse arises when it is extracted out from
its original home,, Once extracted, it is subject to
a b u s e o f a 11 k :i. n d s, t a k e n a s w h a t i t i s N 0 T a n
ost en s i ve d ef i n i t i on of pr i vat e sen sat i on a I: p r esei. t
dis cu ssian. It is e xtremely difficult to b e a w are of t1. o
s e n s el es s n e s s o f t h i s m e t a physical a b u s e b e c a u s e i t :i a
indistinguishable from an ordinav sentence.
Umi Strawson queried, Do we even in fact find ourselvi.
misremembering the use of very simple wards of our
1anguage, and having to correct ourseIves by attentian
to others' use? See Strawson:'Review of Philosophical
Investigation' in Pitcher(ed) Philosophical
28
Investigtion p.44
This becomes c1ear when Wje come to Wittgnstein' s round
up of the whole argument ifi PI 270,271,
CHAPTER 3
He mentioned this unjustified accusation., and tried to
shake it off as well, in PI 281, 304-307,' RPP v.. 1 659:
But doesn't what you say come to this: 'there is no
p a i n, f or ex amp 1 e, w i t h out p a i n -b eh a v i our ?'1 (PI 2 8 :l)
And yet you again and again reach the cone1 usion I hut
the sensation is a nothing(PI 304),
1'But yau sure 1 y cannot deny that, for ev,ample, in
remembering, an :inner process takes place (PI 305).




This distinction is adopted from Alan Donagan's paper:
Wittgenstein on Sensation in G, Pitcher(ed),
Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigation, p.329.
I am indebted to Kenny for placing Wittgenstein's
r ef I ect i on i n the coritex t of ant i --Cartesianism. See
Kenny: Cartesian Privacy in G. Pitcher(ed.),
Wi11genstein s PI iIosophica1 Investigation, p.352.
'In Philosophy, the comparison of thinking to a









bundles 'Behaviourism and the Private Language Argument
in Q.R. Jones (ed) Jhe Private Language Argument p. 105.
See Strawson, p.42 -43 5 Ayer, p.2575 bundle, p.104
1 Fl» l~l rM h i' ll KZi i'- -i P -a :z A- 111~ H m 1 T 7!» 1 uwi nc-
bundle, p.. 105,
Ibid, p,104.
ji t 7 8
'But could we also imagine a language in which a person
could write down or give vocal expression to his inner
experience- his feelings, moods, and the rest— far bis
private use? Well ,can we da sa in our ordinary
lannuaoe? But that is not what I mean.' (PI 243)
8.
Strawson, p.44; Ayer, p.256-257j Robert J. Fogelin,
p.160-163? Hund1e, p «108 -110;Thomson, p.184-186.
Bee NFL, p.270 and Rush, II, p.9.
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